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Abstract. Risk and reliability dominate water supply discussions in the arid western 
United States in light of increasing demand and finite, weather-dependant supply. Thus 
water agencies increasingly turn to contractual mechanisms such as dry-year options to 
manage supply risk in advance of need. Although a few water agencies across the West 
have implemented dry-year options, sufficient data for conventional econometric analysis 
do not yet exist. We thus utilize experimental economics to analyze the effect of annual 
dry-year options on water markets. We consider how market structure (competitive 
versus monopsony power) and option contract availability affect water price and 
allocation within a market and find that realized gains from trade are on average higher 
when options can be traded, by 46% in competitive markets and by 63% in dominant 
buyer markets. Important for the political feasibility of such markets, we also find that 
gains from trade, once an options market is available, are much more evenly distributed 
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  1Introduction 
Population growth and environmental demands on existing water supplies will 
continue to increase in California and elsewhere in the coming years. To address this 
worsening scarcity problem, many regions have developed water markets to facilitate 
transfer of water from existing rights holders to buyers with higher-value uses. In the 
future, even more flexible arrangements for trading water, such as option contracts and 
water banks, could further increase allocative efficiency. Under a typical option 
agreement, a water agency pays an option premium in the fall for the right to purchase 
water from a seller should the water year turn out to be dry. If the water year turns out to 
be wet so that the holder of the option has sufficient supplies, the water is neither 
transferred nor paid for, but the buyer still pays the seller the option premium. The option 
value represents the value to the buyer of sharing the risk of water supply uncertainty 
with the seller (Howitt 1998). 
We use experimental economics to elicit information on efficiency gains and 
distributional effects from water options. Specifically, we utilize the controlled laboratory 
environment to isolate the effects of market concentration and contract availability on the 
efficiency of markets, in a way that is not possible with the minimal data on existing 
water options contracts. The laboratory permits observation of trader behavior in the 
presence of input supply uncertainty, where the uncertainty is driven by stochastic 
realizations of a water input. The laboratory also permits study of buyer concentration on 
market outcomes, a relevant topic since existing bilateral options in California are 
primarily purchased by a single entity, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
  2California (MWD).
1 Furthermore, since subjects in this study were not informed that the 
good they were trading was water, the results are generalizable to other natural resources 
used as inputs into production processes. 
California Water Markets 
In California, matching supply with demand is complicated by the fact that most 
precipitation falls in the northern part of the state while population centers and high-value 
agriculture lie in the more arid central and southern parts of the state. Also, precipitation 
varies significantly from year to year.
2 Increased use of flexible contract instruments such 
as options could assist more conventional market transfers in allocating water. The 
California Department of Water Resources (CDWR) has sponsored option contracts 
among water agencies in the past (Jercich 1997); in other instances, water agencies have 
initiated such deals themselves (San Diego County Water Agency; Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California).  
Regardless of whether future option agreements take place under the sponsorship 
of a state agency or bilaterally, increased water option activity in the future is desirable 
on efficiency grounds, as options have several important advantages over permanent 
transfers or short-term leases. For instance, options often require less regulatory oversight 
than permanent transfers, as impacts to the environment and third parties are smaller if 
water is only transferred during dry years when it has the highest scarcity value (Hanak 
2001). Options are also more likely to be acceptable to exporting communities concerned 
about loss of long-term economic viability than permanent transfers or leases that occur 
                                                 
1 MWD is a wholesale water agency whose 26 member water agencies collectively serve approximately 17 
million people in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas. 
2 Unimpaired runoff on the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers was less than 80% or greater than 120% of 
average in 40 and 34, respectively, of the 100 years between 1908 and 2007 (California Department of 
Water Resources 2007). 
  3every year. Options also offer several advantages over short-term leases, chief among 
them the fact that options may help resolve in advance different preferences of buyers 
and sellers regarding the timing and manner of transfer. Options also offer several 
advantages over short-term leases, chief among them the fact that options may help 
resolve in advance different buyer and seller preferences regarding the timing and manner 
of transfer. For example, a rice grower may be persuaded by an option premium to 
postpone his planting decision until after a certain date (namely, the exercise date of the 
option contract) if the option premium he receives in the fall is sufficient to cover the 
added costs he incurs from waiting (Howitt, Moore and Smith 1992; Dixon, Moore and 
Schechter 1993; Coppock and Kreith 1992).  
Analysis of existing option trading activity in California would provide valuable 
information to policymakers regarding gains from trade associated with implementation 
of option agreements, who would benefit from them, and how their existence might 
change trading behavior in the underlying water market. However, although use of 
option agreements is growing, their number is still small enough that conventional 
quantitative analysis of existing data is difficult. Even during dry years, markets are still 
relatively thin; trades that occur through market-based prices rather than administratively 
set prices are even rarer. Furthermore, because market agents are often reluctant to reveal 
transaction prices, there are very few observations of water trades, let alone water 
options, to provide a basis for econometric estimation. Two recent studies have analyzed 
water options (Watters 1995; Villinski 2003), but neither study was able to perform 
formal tests of efficiency, for lack of sufficient data. 
  4We thus turn to experiments to address the question of whether sufficient gains 
from trade might be generated from more widespread use of annual dry-year options. 
Experiments have been used to test alternative institutional designs and to facilitate the 
design of workable policies before they are needed. Laboratory experiments are 
politically and financially less expensive and yield faster results than immediate 
implementation of a new market institution in the real world. Experiments allow 
policymakers to explore the viability of new market institutions under controlled 
experimental conditions, providing them with the opportunity to mitigate unforeseen 
problems before costly or irreversible decisions have been made (Murphy et al. 2000). 
Experiments have been used to test a number of issues related specifically to 
water. One such area of active research has been to explore the potential for water market 
institutions to reduce water salinity. For example, Ward et al. (2007) test different auction 
mechanisms and the use of communication among farmers for a proposed recharge cap 
and trade market in the Bet Bet catchment in Victoria, Australia.
3
Murphy et al. (2000) are the first to apply experimental economics specifically to 
water markets. They focus on conveyance, an issue central to water allocation in arid 
regions, by evaluating the implications of two different property right structures for 
conveyance capacity. Their results suggest that cotenancy on conveyance facilities 
increases efficiency and surplus and minimizes price volatility, relative to monopoly 
control. Murphy et al. (2003) examine alternative water market institutions for protecting 
third parties from economic harm resulting from water exports. The issue is particularly 
relevant in the water market setting because of the powerful political role third parties 
                                                 
3 Tisdell, Ward and Cason (2004) and Duke, Gangadharan and Cason (2007) also conduct cap and trade 
market experiments in Australia, this time as a way to mitigate water quality issues related to salinity. 
  5often play in the regulatory approval process. Murphy et al. (2007) compare three 
institutions for incorporating environmental instream flows into water markets.  These 
papers test the use of incentive-based market solutions to address common problems in 
water markets and provide a springboard for discussion among policymakers of the 
relative merits of different solutions to common problems in water markets. 
Garrido (2007) tests two elements of recent regulations authorizing water markets 
in Spain, namely the effects of banking and of proposed seniority rules on market 
efficiency. He finds that relaxing a restriction that junior rights holders are not allowed to 
purchase water from senior users increases senior rights holders' welfare without 
decreasing junior users' welfare. He also demonstrates that allowing users to bank water 
from one season to the next without losing rights to the water increases stock levels and 
reduces market price instability.
4  
In California, where active water markets already exist, the issue is no longer 
whether water markets would improve efficiency, but rather what type of trading would 
improve efficiency the most. We thus explore the relative efficiency of different market 
environments. The elements of interest are the effects of market power and contract 
availability on market efficiency: What is the effect of annual water options on the 
California wholesale water market under alternative market structure assumptions? 
                                                 
4 The experimental literature on trading in option markets is rather thin, and its major focus is on 
how such markets aggregate information that is distributed asymmetrically among traders. For example, 
Kluger and Wyatt (1995) find that adding an options market to an asset market with asymmetrically 
informed agents increases the speed of information dispersion in the market and therefore efficiency, 
similar to results for future markets in the first asset market experiment (Forsythe et al., 1982). Abbink and 
Rockenbach (2006) observe that students perform better in an option pricing decision (without markets) 
than professional traders. For overviews of the experimental asset market literature, see Sunder (1995, 
2007). 
 
  6We are also interested in the distribution of gains from trade. Water allocation 
across the state has always been a contentious issue in California. Proponents of more 
flexible market mechanisms must overcome political hurdles. An efficiency-enhancing 
mechanism might not be implemented if the additional gains from trade were distributed 
more unevenly, an observation that is particularly apt in light of the monopsonic water 
market structure in the state. 
Experimental Design 
Subjects participated in computerized markets with four sellers and either one or four 
buyers. Each subject was assigned a role as buyer or seller, which reflects real-world 
conditions in California: Purchasers of annual water options in California are likely to be 
high-value agricultural and urban water agencies, and sellers are likely to be irrigation 
districts whose farmers can to some extent fallow low-value crops just before planting 
would have occurred. Within the experiment, buyers had value functions parameterized 
to mimic the incentives of urban and high-value agricultural water agencies that are 
willing to purchase water if the price is sufficiently low. Sellers had cost functions 
parameterized to mimic the incentives of low-value agricultural water agencies that are 
willing to sell if the price is sufficiently high. Sellers may consequently choose to lease 
out water in dry years when its market value is high and to retain the water as an 
agricultural input in wet and normal years. 
Recall that the most notable feature of water supply in the western United States 
and California in particular is temporal and spatial supply variability. This experiment 
captures temporal fluctuations by varying the initial endowment of water subjects receive 
at the start of each period. Subjects' initial endowment of water has a uniform distribution 
  7reflecting three states of nature: dry, normal and wet.
5 Option value and usage may vary 
by location depending on hydrologic conditions, storage reserves, and physical and 
financial constraints on conveyance. We abstract from this spatial aspect of water trading 
to focus on the dynamic effect of option availability on water markets, and how the 
impact of option availability might vary within competitive versus dominant buyer 
markets.  
We conducted experiments during the 2006-07 academic year. Subjects were 
drawn from the undergraduate student population at the University of California, Davis 
and at California State University Sacramento. In total, 365 subjects participated in the 
experiment, in 58 markets of five to eight subjects each. Each session lasted 
approximately two hours, and subjects earned approximately $30 on average. 
Experimental sessions were conducted using the software program Z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). 
Buyers and sellers traded water through a non-uniform price double auction 
according to the heterogeneous value functions assigned to them at the start of the 
session.
6 Subjects participated in one of four treatments, which varied by market 
concentration (competitive versus monopsony) and market institution (short-term 
contracts alone versus short-term contracts and option contracts). Subjects in all 
treatments first traded the generic good (“coupons'') under conditions of certainty for 
eight periods, during Part 1 of the session. Each period, subjects learned the size of their 
                                                 
5 CDWR classifies water years as dry, critically dry, above normal, below normal, or wet using two indices, 
the Sacramento Valley Water Year Index and the San Joaquin Valley Water Year Index, both of which 
incorporate current and previous year's water conditions (California Department of Water Resources 2007). 
6 We used neutral language in the experiment. The subjects were told that they were trading a generic 
production input rather than “water” and that the market state could be A, B or C rather than dry, normal or 
wet. 
  8initial endowment of the good for that period before trading commenced. The initial 
endowment of the input good varied from period to period depending on the state of 
nature. In Part 1, subjects were informed at the start of each period whether the market 
was in state A, B, or C, which corresponded to varied endowments that differed by 
coupon size.
7
Subjects were randomly assigned to be buyers and sellers.  Sellers could either 
use their initial endowment of the generic good as an input into a production process, for 
which they received profits according to an increasing marginal cost function, or they 
could sell some or all of their initial endowment to buyers through the auction. Buyers 
received profits according to a decreasing marginal benefit function and could 
supplement their initial endowment of the good by purchasing additional units through 
the auction. In each period, the good was automatically used as an input into the 
production of a final good. Participants were compensated according to their net revenues 
from buying and selling the generic good in the auction and from profits from the sale of 
the final good. The value and cost functions of buyers and sellers were parameterized 
such that positive gains from trade existed in each state of nature.  
After trading the generic good under conditions of certainty for the eight periods 
of Part 1, subjects began Part 2, in which they traded for 14 periods under conditions of 
uncertainty. At the start of each period in Part 2, subjects traded without knowing 
whether their initial endowment of the generic good consisted of four, six or eight 
                                                 
7 Subjects were not permitted to store water from one period to the next. If the experiment allowed for 
banking, the effects of supply risk on equilibrium price and quantity would diminish, just as the presence of 
option contracts is shown here to diminish the effect of supply risk on equilibrium price and quantity.  This 
is because option contracts and banking are to some extent substitutes for one another. Option agreements 
allow agencies to purchase protection from water supply risk in the marketplace; banking and reservoir 
storage minimize excess demand for water in the first place. 
  9coupons. At the conclusion of each period, they learned the realized state of nature and 
their initial endowment of the traded good and what their profits from trade were. 
Subjects were informed that each of the three states of nature could occur with equal 
probability and that each period's state was independent of the previous period's state.
8
The first treatment (C1) was a competitive market structure with four buyers and 
four sellers. The second treatment (DB1) was a dominant buyer market structure with one 
buyer and four sellers. The motivation for this treatment is that MWD has been the 
primary purchaser of option agreements in California. A dominant buyer's initial 
endowment of the generic good was as large as those of a all four competitive buyers in 
the C1 markets. 
In the third and fourth treatments (C2 and DB2), subjects could also buy and sell 
options on the generic good, through a second non-uniform price double auction taking 
place concurrently with the auction for the generic good itself.  Buying an option allowed 
the buyer to purchase an additional unit of the generic good after the state of nature was 
revealed at the conclusion of auction trading, if the buyer elected to do so. If a buyer 
elected to exercise an option, the seller from whom she had purchased the option 
consequently had one unit of the generic good subtracted from his supply and received a 
fixed payment (strike price) for the sold unit of the good.  
Table 1 indicates the number of market observations contained within each 
treatment cell. Note that observations within each treatment cell use one of two sets of 
supply and demand functions. Within Set A, the supply and demand functions from 
which buyer and seller marginal benefit and cost functions are drawn are symmetric.  
                                                 
8 The order of the states of nature was determined randomly for the very first session and then, for the sake 
of comparison and unbeknownst to the subjects, kept the same for the remaining sessions. 
  10Within Set B, the demand function is more inelastic than the supply function. This 
asymmetry is reflective of the California water market, where urban, high-value 
agricultural and environmental water purchasers have demand that is more inelastic than 
the supply elasticity of low-value agricultural growers who are likely to be selling water. 
Table 2 indicates predicted prices and trade quantities for each market structure, 
under each state of nature. The predictions listed in Table 2 are for a setting with no 
supply risk. Figure 1 illustrates the shift in supply and demand functions resulting from 
varying the initial endowment and the resulting market equilibrium price and quantity in 
each state of nature. Maximizing total gains from trade generates the predicted 
competitive price, quantity, and earnings levels; dominant buyer revenue maximization 
generates the dominant buyer predictions.
9 Having the two sets of supply and demand 
functions allows for a comparison of the effect of supply and demand symmetry on 
market outcomes in the presence of supply risk. 
Results 
We conducted two analyses, one for the full data set, and one with a subset of markets. 
Not all subjects immediately understood the market trading environment, due to the 
complexity of the experiment. Patterns of price, quantity traded, and earnings reflect 
learning “on the job.'' However, subjects within some markets never fully grasped the 
double auction market structure for multiple contract instruments or the nature of the 
uncertainty even by the end of the experiment, as evidenced by falling earnings over time 
                                                 
9 Although a dominant buyer in a nonuniform price auction such as this one could in theory perfectly price 
discriminate so as to increase monopsony rents even further, this did not happen in the lab. 
  11or unusual pricing patterns. Consequently we focus here on the analysis of a subset of the  
markets, with 13 of the 58 markets removed from the analysis.
10
Part 1 results. Regardless of treatment, subjects in each market first participated 
in eight periods of trading with no supply risk. Figure 2 shows average coupon price in 
the competitive and dominant buyer markets with Set A supply and demand functions, 
for each of the eight periods. The state of nature, which was known to the subjects during 
these training periods, is indicated at the bottom of the figure (dry, normal, or wet). Also 
included are two dashed lines indicating the theoretically predicted competitive and 
dominant buyer equilibrium prices, respectively. As the state of nature is known to the 
subjects while they are trading, price is inversely proportional to water availability in 
each year.  
Equilibrium prices are close to predicted prices from period 1 onwards. Average 
water qualities traded are lower than predicted in both the competitive and dominant 
buyer cases (Figure 3).  Equilibrium prices and quantities within Set B markets, where 
the cost functions of buyers and sellers are asymmetric, also track predicted prices and 
quantities, though not quite as closely as those of Set A. This is likely a function of the 
fact that it is more difficult for subjects within Set B markets to determine a strategy for 
trading when both equilibrium price and quantity vary by year type.  
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that by the conclusion of Part 1, a sufficient number of 
subjects understood the basic experimental setting to generate market-level prices and 
                                                 
10 In particular, six of the 35 dominant buyers ended the experiment with negative earnings and within five 
of the 25 competitive markets, at least one buyer or seller ended the experiment with negative earnings 
equal to twice the amount of the show-up fee. In seven of the 30 markets with options, equilibrium option 
price at the end of the experiment was closer to the theoretically expected water price than to the 
theoretically expected option price, indicating confusion within the market regarding the purpose and 
inherent value of an option. The cardinal rankings of the coefficient point estimates on the smaller data set 
were the same as those of the full data set, though fewer coefficients on the full data set were statistically 
significantly different than zero. 
  12traded quantities that respond to changes in availability of the risky input from period to 
period. These certainty results can consequently be used as a benchmark for the Part 2 
results described below; any subject confusion in Part 2 can be attributed to the 
introduction of supply risk and option contracts rather than confusion regarding the basic 
trading environment. 
Part 2 results. Subjects were introduced to input supply risk at the start of Part 2. 
Once subjects no longer knew their initial endowment of the input while trading, their 
bidding behavior changed significantly.  Namely, price no longer responded to variability 
of water supply. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts the prices for each 
transaction within a single competitive market. (Supply risk was introduced at the vertical 
line.)  
Figure 5 graphs average prices within each period, by treatment. As in Figure 2, 
the state of nature is indicated at the bottom of the figure (dry, normal, or wet). T-tests 
comparing treatment means indicate some differences across treatment. Competitive 
treatment prices are statistically greater, on average, than those of the dominant buyer 
treatments (p=0.00). When options are introduced, competitive water market prices 
decrease (p=0.00) but those of dominant buyer markets do not (p=0.78). Controlling for 
market structure and period, markets where options can be traded exhibit lower water 
price variability than no-option markets. Also included at the bottom of Figure 5 are the 
average option prices for each of the two treatments where option trading was permitted. 
There is a distinct downward movement in option price over the course of Part 2, 
indicating that significant learning regarding the value of an option occurs during the 
  13experiment itself. Option prices in the competitive and dominant buyer markets are on 
average not statistically significantly different from each other (p=0.42).  
Figures 6 and 7 indicate how many coupons were purchased on average within 
competitive and dominant buyer treatments, respectively, as well as how many options 
were purchased and exercised on average within the two option treatments. The state of 
nature in each period is also indicated along the bottom of Figures 6 and 7. T-tests 
comparing treatment means indicate significantly fewer water units traded in dominant 
buyer markets than competitive markets (p=0.00). However, when exercised options are 
included, the quantity of water units traded is higher on average within competitive 
markets (p=0.00). Within both market structures, subjects substitute away from water to 
options when such contracts are available to them. The inverse relationship between 
water availability and the number of options exercised indicates that subjects tend to 
exercise their options to purchase water in dry years. Further, it is interesting to compare 
the total number of coupons exchanged—coupons traded and, where permitted, options 
exercised—for each of the four treatments. The two treatments where options can be 
traded have higher variability in number of coupons purchased between periods, as 
subjects in the with-options treatments have the opportunity ex post to adjust the number 
of coupons they purchase.  
These figures provide a graphical representation of the relative prices and 
quantities of the four treatments. We next perform a more rigorous statistical comparison 
between treatments. Bidding and trading activity in the early trading periods is more 
likely to reflect subject learning than profit-maximizing trading behavior. To account for 
learning, we discount early periods before subjects understood the game by utilizing the 
  14asymptotic convergence technique of Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995), adapted from 
Ashenfelter et al. (1992). In the two equations that follow, the dependent variable yit is 
the variable of interest observed within market i at time t: water or option prices, number 
of water or option units traded, earnings, or number of options exercised.
11 The 
convergence equation for the first four of these variables is the following:  
, / ) 1 ( ) / 1 ( ... ) / 1 ( ... ) / 1 ( ) / 1 ( 1 2 1 1 2 12 1 11 u Water Cost t t B t D B t D B t D B t D B y t i n n i i it + + + − + + + + + + = −
 (1) 
The variable Bit is the estimated coefficient on the variable of interest within market i at 
time t. The variable Di is a dummy variable equal to 1 for market i and 0 otherwise and is 
weighted by 1/t so that later periods receive greater weight in the determination of the 
dependent variable of interest. The technique is effectively a weighted fixed effects linear 
regression, with later periods weighted more heavily than earlier periods, where all 
markets within a treatment are forced to converge to a single coefficient, B2. The variable 
Costi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for Set B markets and 0 otherwise. Subjects may 
formulate their expectations regarding some variables with the previous water year’s 
conditions in mind even though they are told the events are independent. We thus control 
for lagged water year, Watert-1, in calculating the asymptotic coefficients for price and 
number of units traded for both water and options.  
The remaining two variables of interest, earnings and number of options 
exercised, are more likely to be influenced by current water conditions. Earnings are 
lower when less water is available, and the decision to exercise options is made ex post, 
with full knowledge of current water conditions. The asymptotic equation for earnings 
and quantity of exercised options is thus: 
                                                 
11 The dependent variable of interest “number of water units traded” includes exercised options. 
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In equations 1 and 2, the variable Costi is equal to 1 if buyers and sellers in the market 
have asymmetric cost functions and is equal to 0 otherwise. The asymptotic coefficients 
from this convergence process are reported in Table 3.
12  Estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Prais--Winsten transformation.  
The price, quantity, and earnings estimates in Table 3 are the basis for comparing 
the relative efficiency of the four treatments. Correcting for autocorrelation reveals 
autocorrelation ρ-coefficients close to ρ =.90 for some treatments. Each market therefore 
really provides only one observation rather than independent observations for each of the 
14 periods of Part 2. Thus the pairwise t-test comparisons are based on the number of 
markets within a treatment rather than the number of markets times the number of periods 
within a treatment.  
An important research question of this paper concerns efficiency: Does the 
introduction of an option market in addition to the spot market increase efficiency? Even 
though the option market environment is more complicated, the answer is clearly 
affirmative: 
Result 1. Allowing options to be traded increases efficiency in both the 
competitive and dominant buyer cases, as measured by market earnings. The ability to 
trade options increases market earnings on average by 63% for competitive markets and 
67% for dominant buyer markets. Buyers are able to make additional beneficial trades 
after the water type is revealed and thus increase earnings.  That earnings are higher 
                                                 
12 Table 3 reports price, quantity and earnings levels on the combined data of sets A and B.  Results on Sets 
A and B individually do not differ significantly from those presented in Table 3, other than that there is 
insufficient data in some cells of Set B to perform standard hypothesis tests.  
  16where options can be traded in spite of the increased complexity associated with 
participating in two markets simultaneously strengthens our finding that options increase 
gains from trade. These gains were realized during dry periods, reflecting subject use of 
options to manage supply uncertainty.
13  
We find no statistically significant difference between treatments in option price, 
option trades, or options exercised. This is likely due to the fact that subjects may use the 
option market in a variety of ways to increase their earnings. These multiple strategies do 
not necessarily aggregate nicely to clear-cut, treatment-wide predictions of price and 
quantity. 
That the introduction of options does not only result in higher efficiency in the 
competitive markets but also in the market with monopsony is important for California, 
where substantial political discussion surrounds the role of the MWD as dominant buyer. 
The basis of this discussion, the potential for market power, is reflected in the 
experimental results comparing treatments without options and partly in the results 
comparing treatments with options (Result 2). The most remarkable result is the lack of 
statistical significance between earnings in the two types of markets when options can be 
traded (Result 2a):  
Result 2. The presence of a dominant buyer in the market induces fewer trades 
and lower water prices relative to the competitive case in markets with and without 
options. Total earnings are also lower in monopsonistic markets when options are not 
available. Result 2a. Earnings are not statistically different between competitive markets 
and markets with a dominant buyer when options are available. In the markets without 
                                                 
13 Regression results demonstrating that both buyers and sellers have increased earnings during dry periods 
due to options are available from the authors on request. 
  17options, the number of water units traded (including options exercised) is 25% lower in 
the dominant buyer treatment relative to the competitive treatment. Water price decreases 
by 20%, and earnings are lower by 27%. In the markets with options, the number of 
water units traded is also 25% lower in the dominant buyer treatment relative to the 
competitive treatment, though water price decreases by only 5% and earnings are not 
significantly different from each other.  
The smaller decreases in prices and earnings when options are present may be due 
to the fact that when options can be traded, the dominant buyer's attention is divided 
between the water and option auctions. It may also be the case that the supply risk 
diminishes the ability of dominant buyers to fully exploit their market power. Sellers 
retain more surplus in the dominant buyer markets than the competitive buyer markets, as 
water price in the dominant buyer markets does not fall by as much as in the competitive 
buyer markets. 
Result 3. The ability to trade options generally induces lower water prices in the 
competitive market but has little effect on price and quantity in the dominant buyer 
market. In competitive markets, water prices are 12% lower when options can be traded. 
The number of water units traded in auction decreases by 15%, though when options 
exercised ex post are also counted, water transferred actually increases by 8%. In 
dominant buyer markets, water prices increase by 5% when options can be traded. 
However, the ability to trade options has no statistically significant effect on the total 
number of water units transferred within dominant buyer markets. 
One of the biggest obstacles for the political acceptability of any change in market 
institutions for California water markets does not concern efficiency, but fairness and 
  18equity—a new market instrument might increase overall efficiency but will the dominant 
buyer be able to absorb all gains for itself? Theory is silent on distribution of GFT from 
adoption of options.  The answer found in the data of our experiment, however, is an 
unambiguous “no.” To the contrary, adding options lessens the vastly unequal 
distribution of gains from trade between the competitive sellers and the dominant buyers:  
Result 4. Options increase distributional equity between buyers and sellers. Our 
results indicate that sellers increase their percentage of total gains from trade when 
options are available, in both the competitive and dominant buyer markets. Particularly, 
and most importantly for California, the extremely one-sided distribution of gains in the 
dominant buyer treatment without options becomes more evenly distributed once options 
are available (Table 4).  Some of this increase in GFT to sellers likely results from the 
purchase and exercise of options at relatively high prices in earlier periods, but not all of 
it; in later periods when markets have converged on option prices, seller GFT is still 
higher in markets where options can be traded. 
A final result concerns the experimental design: In one third of our experimental 
markets, traders were given asymmetric cost functions, which better reflects real-world 
conditions in California. 
Result 5. Asymmetric buyer and seller cost functions have minimal effect on price, 
quantity, and earnings. Although there are not sufficient degrees of freedom in the data to 
generate asymptotic convergence coefficients specifically for each cost function, we 
include an indicator variable for cost function in the convergence coefficient regressions 
presented in Table 3. As measured by this indicator variable, the asymmetric cost 
function has no statistically significant effect on earnings or price. Quantity of water 
  19transferred is lower when the cost function is asymmetric.  
Conclusion 
Option markets are not well-developed in California. Options are more 
complicated than straightforward water transfers and politically less acceptable, yet they 
have the potential to increase earnings and enable additional transfers on the margin.  
Within the experiment, we find evidence that overall earnings increase with the addition 
of options, and, particularly in the important case of the existence of a dominant buyer, 
that this increase evens out the distribution of gains from trade.  There is also a 
statistically significant increase in the number of water units transferred in both the 
competitive and dominant buyer markets, though the increase is not economically 
significant. Within our experiment, competitive option prices are 19% of water prices 
within the same treatment; dominant buyer option prices are 27% of water price. Bilateral 
option contracts in California have option values approximately 10% of the underlying 
value of water. Thus, our results are high relative to those observed in California option 
markets. Option price in most markets continued to decline in the latter periods of the 
experiment.  If there had been more periods, option price would have likely continued to 
decline, perhaps to levels as low as those observed in existing bilateral contracts in 
California.  Second, in order to isolate the effects of options, this experiment does not 
permit banking.  If subjects had been able to store water across periods, option value as a 
percentage of water price may have been even closer to premiums observed in existing 
bilateral contracts in California.  
This analysis provides practical insights into the design of water options markets 
by isolating the effects of market concentration and the availability of different contract 
  20instruments on the efficiency of markets.  Earnings of subjects within the laboratory 
setting increase on average by 46% for competitive markets and by 63% for dominant 
buyer markets when options are available. The experimental markets described here are 
thin, as are the wholesale water markets they represent.  Although the experimental 
setting abstracts away from many features of a real water market, the laboratory results 
do show that it is possible for thin markets to converge to relatively competitive price and 
quantity levels in the presence of water supply risk. 
Water policymakers throughout the western United States are thinking about ways 
to manage the next multi-year drought.  When California next experiences a series of dry 
years, CDWR and other policymakers within the state may once again consider a market 
for water options, as they last did in 1994-95, so that negotiations occur well in advance 
of need and sellers are compensated for sharing water supply risk. Future experimental 
research in this vein may explore the effect of the variance of water supply on option 
price and quantity traded, as forecasts of available water supplies in California 
incorporate new infrastructure and climate change predictions.  Exploring the relationship 
between annual options and multiple-exercise options which can be exercised a pre-
specified number of times over the course of a longer-term contract may also be of 
interest. Such contracts could provide water-exporting agricultural communities with 
additional certainty regarding future water supplies to help them cope with third-party 
impacts of water exports. 
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Figure 1. Market Equilibrium Conditions by Year Type for Set A (Symmetric) (left 
side) and B (Asymmetric) Cost Functions 
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Note: The dashed lines indicate theoretical water price predictions in competitive and 
dominant buyer markets, respectively. 
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Note: The dashed lines indicate theoretical predictions of water units traded in 
competitive and dominant buyer markets, respectively. 
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Figure 6. Number of Water and Option Trades by Treatment, Competitive Markets 
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  30Figure 7. Number of Water and Exercised Option Trades by Treatment, Dominant 
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  31Table 1. Experimental Sessions Summary 
 
Set A Supply and Demand Functions (symmetric)  Number of Observations 
Treatment Name  Dominant Buyer  Options  Sacramento State  UC Davis  Total 
C1a No  No  4  4  8 
C2a No  Yes  4  4  8 
DB1a Yes  No  6  6  12 
DB2a Yes  Yes  7  5  12 
          
 
Set B Supply and Demand Functions 
(asymmetric)  Number of Observations 
Treatment Name  Dominant Buyer  Options  Sacramento State  UC Davis  Total 
C1b No  No  2  2  4 
C2b No  Yes  3  2  5 
DB1b Yes  No  2  2  4 
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Table 2. Theoretical Predictions with No Supply Risk 
 
  Price Quantity 
Set A  C  DB  C  DB 
Dry 96  85  13  8 
Normal 80  66  13  8 
Wet   64  53  13  8 
        
  Price Quantity 
Set B  C  DB  C  DB 
Dry 105  94  16  12 
Normal 80  74  13  10 





 Table 3. Price, Quantity, and Earnings Levels in Part 2 (With Supply Risk) 
 













C1:  Competitive/No  Options    198.45  85.40  10.94 10.44     
   (13.47)***  (1.89)***  (0.65)***  (0.57)***          
C2:  Competitive/With  Options        290.69 75.17 9.28  11.23  13.99 3.65 2.15
    (27.80)***              (1.08)*** (0.79)*** (0.79)*** (7.31)* (.89)*** (0.34)***
DB1: Dominant Buyer/No Options  144.38  68.23  8.28  7.80       
   (11.33)***  (1.48)***  (0.59)***  (0.53)***          
DB2: Dominant Buyer/With 
Options  235.70              71.43 7.48 8.47 19.32 2.33 1.36
    (33.40)***              (1.33)*** (0.69)*** (0.83)*** (4.03)*** (0.54)*** (0.29)***
Cost Function (=1 for Set B 
Markets)  47.10              0.16 -1.83 -1.50 3.39 0.35 0.19
    (24.08)              (1.67) (0.57)*** (0.63)** (8.44) (0.32) (0.14)
Water_t    1267.78         -0.50
   (8.05)***                 (0.06)*** 
Water_t-1                0.24 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.00  
      (0.50)  (0.01)  (0.01)         (0.06) (0.01)
Autocorrelation  coefficient  (rho)                0.20 0.14 0.77 0.71 0.91 0.88 0.39
Number  of  Observations  630              582 627 627 197 627 629
R-squared  0.9821              0.9726 0.6629 0.7045 0.5137 0.1685 0.3465
                       
p-values for F-test of equivalence of coefficients between treatments: 
C1 - C2  0.0017  0.0000  0.0745  0.3797       
DB1 - DB2  0.0096  0.0804  0.3275  0.4710       
C1  – DB1             0.0043  0.0000  0.0005 0.0001
C2  –  DB2                0.1928 0.0150 0.0615 0.0129 0.4848 0.1987 0.8060
 
Notes: Each column is a single regression, convergence method of NPR 1995 etc. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates 10%; ** indicates 5%; *** indicates 
1%. Number of markets differs because some markets are dropped due to collinearity.
 Lagged water year coefficients and their standard errors are omitted for 
space reasons. 
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Earnings to Buyers 
C1 (n=12)  55      142 176 28% 
  (21.54)**      (19.23)*** (12.02)***  
        
C2 (n=8)  139        152 287 48%
   (16.61)***      (28.80)*** (33.65)***  
Increase in GFT from Adding Options    
      
   
 
Dominant Buyer 




Earnings to Buyers 
DB1 (n=15)  141        2 161 98%
  (15.73)***      (12.02) (15.85)***  
        
DB2 (n=10)  127        106 269 54%
   (14.87)***      (31.57)** (63.63)***  
Increase in GFT from Adding Options  67%   
 
Notes: Buyer, seller, and total earnings are the average per-period earnings of buyers, sellers, and buyers and sellers combined, within a treatment.  All 
coefficients are asymptotic convergence coefficients calculated according to Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995). For this reason, buyer and seller earnings do 
not sum to the market earnings within a given treatment. “Percentage of Earnings to Buyers” is buyer earnings divided by the sum of buyer and seller earnings.  
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